Excerpt from Essay:
Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster: What Happened and Lessons
The Space Shuttle service Columbia (Columbia) disaster happened on the very first of Feb ., 2003. In its come back journey coming from space next its 29th mission, Columbia disintegrated after re-entering the earth’s atmosphere, killing the complete crew.[footnoteRef: 1] Whereas technical failures had been responsible for the disasters, research have widely faulted zero NASA’s efficiency culture, particularly in terms of organisational structure, communication, and decision making techniques.[footnoteRef: 2],[footnoteRef: 3] This kind of paper goes into these issues, clearly highlighting why the disaster took place and how it might have been avoided. [1: S. M. McDanels, W. M. Mayeaux, T. E. Collins, G. A. Jerman, R. S. Piascik, Ur. W. Russell, and T. R. Shah. “An Overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia Crash from Restoration Through Reconstruction, ” Diary of Failure Analysis and Prevention 6th, no . one particular (February 2006): 82-91. ] [2: Julianne G. Mahler, Organization Learning at NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA): The Opposition and Columbia Accidents (Washington D. C: Georgetown University or college Press, 2009). ] [3: Ruth Guthrie and Conrad Shayo, “The Columbia Devastation: Culture, Marketing and sales communications Change. inches Journal of Cases in Information Technology several, no . a few (July 2005): 57-76. ]
The Disaster
The National Airline and Space Administration (NASA) launched Space Shuttle Columbia on 04 12, 81. The shuttle service was the initial orbiter in NASA’s Space Shuttle Plan. Initiated 39 years ago, the aim of this software was to have got regular missions to and from space. More importantly, the program was designed to lower the price of space tasks.[footnoteRef: 4] Prior spacecrafts will be destroyed upon re-entering the entire world, meaning that NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) had to develop a new spacecraft for every mission. With the Shuttle Program, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) wanted to build reusable orbiters in an effort to lessen space exploration costs. [4: Ibid, 59. ]
Columbia conducted twenty eight missions as a whole, an equivalent of 300. 7 days in space, 4, 808 orbits, and 201, 497, 772 km. Columbia’s previous mission, nevertheless , ended desperately. Shortly after re-entry into the globe’s atmosphere, the shuttle seperated, killing every seven crew members. The debris was recovered in numerous parts of Texas and Louisiana.[footnoteRef: 5] The disaster started to be the second tragedy in the Space Shuttle System after the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger (Challenger) disaster. In the aftermath with the disaster, the Space Shuttle System was in the short term halted. The development of the International Space Train station (ISS) was also late. [5: S. M. McDanels, M. M. Mayeaux, T. Elizabeth. Collins, G. A. Jerman, R. T. Piascik, L. W. Russell, and S i9000. R. Shah. “An Review of the Space Shuttle service Columbia Accident from Restoration Through Renovation, ” Record of Failure Analysis and Prevention 6, no . one particular (February 2006): 82-91. ]
Technical Failures
In the months following a disaster, a wide-ranging investigation was installed to uncover the reasons for the car accident. Based on failure analysis techniques, video footages taken during takeoff, and interrogation of NASA staff, the research revealed surprising findings.[footnoteRef: 6] During launch, at about 66, 000 toes above the area of the earth, a bit of foam was shed from the shuttle’s external gasoline tank.[footnoteRef: 7] A spacecraft’s external gasoline tank is a major gas tank. The tank is definitely insulated with foam to stop the formation of ice launched filled with liquefied oxygen and hydrogen. If shed during takeoff, such ice can inflict destruction on the spacecraft. In this case, the shed polyurethane foam struck the shuttle’s kept wing, making a hole. During re-entry in the earth’s ambiance, the damage produced by foam shedding acceptable the penetration of atmospheric air in the shuttle’s inside wing. Because of this, the spacecraft became volatile and disintegrated. [6: S. L. McDanels and Richard W. Russell, “The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation and Reconstruction: 2 years Later. inch Microscopy Contemporary society of America (2005): 1-2. ] [7: McDanels ou al. in 5. ]
The 28th launch was not the first-time foam shedding have been observed – similar situations had been noticed in previous releases.[footnoteRef: 8] non-etheless, no considerable measures were undertaken to rectify the challenge in large part mainly because all past occurrences did not result in any kind of accident. In most preceding releases in which foam shedding happened, the missions were completed successfully. Essentially, NASA had become accustomed to the phenomenon, constantly maintaining that it did not create any significant risks. [8: Ruth Guthrie and Conrad Shayo, “The Columbia Disaster: Culture, Communications Change. ” Journal of Cases on Technology 7, number 3 (July 2005): 57-76. ]
During the investigation, an important question was to determine exactly why froth shedding afflicted Columbia simply during re-entry. In other words, given that the dropping occurred during takeoff, whats the reason the spacecraft completed the mission successfully, but disintegrated while re-entering the globe’s atmosphere? During re-entry, a spacecraft relies on its thermal protection program to safeguard the aluminium framework.[footnoteRef: 9] This protection is enabled simply by heat-resistant elements (e. g. tile surfaces) in the heat protection program. During the release, the thermal protection system experienced significant damage. More specifically, the tiles were heavily damaged, limiting the cold weather protection program from undertaking its efficiency function.[footnoteRef: 10] Unable to withstand the pressure of atmospheric gases plus the heat, the spacecraft increased. [9: Katie Boyles, Michael Gallis, and Gerald Lebeau. “DSMC Simulations for the Columbia Shuttle Orbiter Accident Exploration. ” 37th AIAA Thermophysics Conference, 2005. ] [10: A. M. Capece, R. Kinmonth, M. Chumakov, L. M. Deacon, and A. R. Marder. “Failure analysis of a thermal tile around the space shuttle Columbia. inch Journal of Failure Analysis and Reduction 6, no . 1 (2006): 55-60. ]
Organisational Issues
Technical failure undoubtedly caused Columbia to break down upon re-entering the globe’s atmosphere. non-etheless, independent research revealed that the technical inability did not only happen – it was a great outcome of serious organizational failures at NASA.[footnoteRef: 11],[footnoteRef: 12] 1st, the administration of NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) failed to address a problem that had been identified a long time before the Columbia disaster. Judging from previous experiences, NASA had arrive to view the occurrence of froth shedding as normal. In her book Challenger Release Decision Method, Diane Vaughan describes this kind of phenomenon while the “normalisation of deviance. “[footnoteRef: 13] It was usual for NASA to move forward with shuttle missions also after the statement of foam dropping during lift-off. [11: Joseph Lorenzo Hall, “Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA). ” Space Policy nineteen, no . 4 (November 2003): 239-247. ] [12: Ruth Guthrie and Conrad Shayo, “The Columbia Disaster: Tradition, Communications Transform. ” Journal of Situations on Information Technology 7, no . 3 (July 2005): 57-76. ] [13: Diane Vaughan, The opposition launch decision: risky technology, culture, and deviance in NASA (Chicago: The University or college of Chicago Press, 1996), 119. ]
NASA’s behaviour discloses serious underestimation of risk on the part of the organisation. Any kind of prudent company, especially one involved with highly technical procedures, would hesitate to continue with a surgical procedure if a technical abnormality can be noted initially of the operation. The fact that technical malocclusions observed in yesteryear did not result in serious effects does not indicate that foreseeable future occurrences from the abnormality will not lead to disastrous consequences. NASA was completely aware that polyurethane foam shedding altered the functioning of the shuttle’s wing structure. Riding around the success of past experience, however , the organisation continued to be reluctant in addressing the challenge – this failed to carry out extensive research to determine the root cause of the shedding of foam during takeoff and therefore take actions to prevent the recurrence in the problem.
Pertaining to Dombrowski, failing to rectify a technical problem it was fully aware of exemplifies serious ethical deficiencies on the part of NASA.[footnoteRef: 14] Like a public enterprise, NASA provides crucial ethical obligations. The organisation’s honest responsibilities are actually greater offered the nature of it is operations. Space missions happen to be critical procedures – right from the development and testing of spacecrafts for the termination of missions. Just about every stage positions serious dangers to not only personnel, but also the general public and the environment. For example , an explosion of a spacecraft during takeoff or perhaps re-entry endangers the life with the crew and also the public. Appropriately, all relevant risks must be carefully identified and robust measures applied to reduce them. Most importantly, any technological anomaly may not be ignored even if previous situations have not made serious consequences. For NASA not to correct the problem of foam shedding as early as it was seen, it put the life with the crew and the auto industry at risk, indication of poor professional and ethical thinking. [14: Paul M. Dombrowski, “The Evolving Encounter of Integrity in Technical and Specialist Communication: Challenger to Columbia, ” IEEE (December 2007): Section 3. ]
NASA’s behaviour also embodies a troubling organisational lifestyle. Organisational lifestyle essentially indicates the ideals, beliefs, traditions, standards, devices and types of procedures common to a given organisation or group of people.[footnoteRef: 15] These norms dictate many aspects of the organisation – from efficiency structure to reporting lines, decision making operations, management-staff relationships, as well as associations with outsiders. In essence, organisational culture impacts how things are done in an organisation, meaning that organisational tradition often contains a significant impact on organisational productivity and performance. [15:
