DISSERTATION As normal disasters happen to be inevitable, it is necessary that we as humans reduce the potential results caused by these kinds of disasters. This essay will certainly explore the 2011 surges of Brisbane and if proper preparing and preparation could have minimised the outcome. It will eventually further check out the impact the Wivenhoe Dam had around the floods and discuss whether dam routine service, level materials and safety measures could have helped.
December 2010 and January 2011 saw Queensland experience record-breaking rainfall that has not been noticed since 60.
Approximately one particular 000 millimetres of rainfall was recorded in January by itself, which triggered the second biggest flood Brisbane has skilled since 1974 (Hornet & McAneney, 2011: 1150). The 2011 surges caused severe devastation during Brisbane with over 21 000 people loosing their very own homes and also 5 500 businesses throughout the city either partially or perhaps completely bombarded. It further more caused around ninety kindergartens and sixty schools being affected and unusable. However the greatest damage was the loss of twenty-three peoples’ lives being a direct response to the massive amounts (Calligeros, 2011: 4).
The Queensland Govt also suffered a major financial repercussion from your floods. Above 440 , 000, 000 dollars was spent in repairing highways, bridges, electric power poles and also other public establishments that were damaged (PM With Mark Colvin 2011). These kinds of spending by the Government induced speculation that if correct planning and preparation been implemented, the Brisbane surges could have been mitigated. This conjecture further bring about the checking out of whether the Wivenhoe Dam helped or hindered the floods.
The Wivenhoe Atteinte opened in 1985 after the great Brisbane floods of 1974 happened and was seen as a strategy to prevent further more floods by happening again. All the public works, creeks and rivers surrounding the Wivenhoe Dam had been connected that any potential overflow may run directly into the Wivenhoe and therefore possess minimal overflowing danger. However what occurred in 2011 was not that which was planned the moment building Wivenhoe many years before. Wivenhoe Atteinte was designed to hold a water supply of 1. 5 million millilitres of water, having a capacity to hold 1 . forty five million millilitres at Total Supply Level or FSL. The 30 million-millilitre difference was allocated as a book for floodwaters to help mitigate flooding (Honert & McAneney, 2011: 1152). Although a reserve level had been allotted in the dam, the issue is that there was constant and heavy rain fall in the previous springtime months. This kind of led to the Wivenhoe catchments being fairly full prior to the downpour that occurred in the December 2010 and January 2011.
This kind of rain even more caused the surrounding rivers and creeks to overflow creating minor lake flooding, with water then simply starting to flow into Wivenhoe to help stop major surging. Leading up to the floods Wivenhoe peaked for 1 . 50pm on Wed 12th of January reaching an astounding installment payments on your 29 , 000, 000 millilitres. (See Appendix one particular ” Desk 1 . 0). A day afterwards Brisbane Water peaked at 4. 46 metres by 2 . 57am on Thurs 13th of January, leading to major surging to begin. (See Appendix two ” Chart 2 . 0).
It was over these two days which the role the SEQWater performed was questioned, as they were aware that the dams had been high enough to overflow. This kind of speculation was further fuelled when it was made known that SEQWater simply released 60 per cent of the dam’s water, occasions before the ton engulfed Brisbane (See Appendix 3 ” Table a few. 0). SEQWater is the firm in charge of the Wivenhoe and Somerset Atteinte and have three simple functioning guidelines that they can must follow (See Appendix 5 ” Rules 4. 0).
It was evident that not one of the recommendations were adopted for a number of causes. Firstly it was evident since when the Wivenhoe and Somerset dams started filling up as a result of the severe wet climate, SEQWater did not release any kind of water via either atteinte until Tues 11th of January. Because they had kept the water idling for too long they had no other choice but to discharge the water at the same time instead of little by little releasing drinking water like they were advised to complete from the Older Flood Businesses Engineer.
Following your flood occurred SEQWater mentioned back, “The flood chambers of the public works were filled to a dangerous by the first flood that there was not sufficient a chance to release this kind of water before the second flood arriving, (Water, 2011: 1158). Therefore although the SEQWater tried to justify their activities, it can be argued that the SEQWater company and the employees were warned some days before hand that simply by releasing a modest amount of water for different moments during the day will help reduce the amount of water damage that could have got potentially took place.
Once it absolutely was discovered that the SEQWater had received many warning of potential alerts, the issue was studied and analysed. It was estimated that between 14: 00 Tues 11th of January and 19: 09 Wednesday 12th of January that 518, 000 millilitres of drinking water was released from Wivenhoe dam making around a 60% contribution to the already rising water around the Brisbane area. (See Appendix 3 ” Desk 3. 0). By six: 09pm Thursday night the 13th of January the water flowing past the Metropolis Gauge was estimated being around 866, 000 millilitres and would still be continuing to rise. See Appendix 5 ” Table 5. 0). The last detailed examination sent out to SEQWater by the Senior Surges Operation Professional it was analysed that if perhaps releases in the Wivenhoe dam were timed appropriately it could have reduced the flooding that happened. (See Appendix 6 ” Analysis six. 0). The Bureau of Meteorology turned out to be helpful throughout the disaster, by providing warnings through their rainfall data. Daily rainfall charts and rainfall maps were updated on the web and made readily available to the general public and those affected. See Appendix 7 and 8 ” Graph and Chart six. 0). The BOM also released a clear warning to both the authorities and the public the amount of rain that was arriving would have the likely durability of a La Nina event. As the info was made offered to anyone with Access to the internet, SEQWater and the Government would have easily seen this information. By doing so they would have been completely able to begin to see the potential menace the nearing heavy rain fall could have and in turn should have helped them help to make a wiser decision.
By choosing to ignore any sort of warning sign furnished by the GRANDE, SEQWater and the employee’s did nothing regarding the almost full catchment even though more heavy rainfall was getting close to. Leading to the conclusion that by simply ignoring the warnings that they demonstrated poor planning and ignorance to the information presented. Throughout this essay can be has been concluded that through proper planning and preparation the Brisbane Massive amounts of 2011 could have been mitigated. Evidence and research proven throughout this essay obviously points unfairly to the SEQWater company and its particular team.
That concluded that although a lot of warnings were issued, the SEQWater and government made a decision to ignore them and therefore leading to all the water being released at once. Even though this kind of natural tragedy could not have been completely prevented through proper preparing and planning it definitely could have been mitigated which usually would in return also result in minimal devastation and break down. This ton has also been named a “dam release flood by hydrologists that were designated with the Insurance Council of Australia.
Again as evidence and analysis implies, with proper organizing and prep yes, the Brisbane ton of 2011 could have been mitigated. APPENDIX 1 TABLE 1 . 0 ” WIVENHOE APPENDIX 2 GRAPH 1 . 0 ” CITY GAUGE APPENDIX 3 DESK 1 . one particular ” RELAEASE FROM WIVENHOE PLUS CITY GAUGE APPENDIX 4 RECOMMENDATIONS 3. 0 ” WORKING GUIDELINES 5. The avalanche storage (or catchments) should certainly generally become kept clear by publishing all the drinking water flowing in the flood storage system before the defined downstream flood event is come to. Releases from the storage program should then be picked to remain under the defined downstream flood event until the avalanche event has passed or the safe-keeping system becomes full. 2. If the avalanche storage program becomes complete, the safe-keeping system must then release all the inflows but emits should never surpass inflows. APPENDIX 5 STAND 1 . 2 ” PREDICTED FLOW PAST CITY DETERMINE APPENDIX six ANALYSIS 6. 0 ” DETAILED RESEARCH 123, 1000 millilitres was discharged both earlier than 14. 00 Wednesday 11th or perhaps ater than 19: 00 Wednesday twelfth rather than during this period, the ton level at the Brisbane City Gauge will not have exceeded the Major avalanche level, or if 335, 000 millilitres was released outside the period 02: 00 Tuesday 10th to 08: 00 Thurs night 13th rather then during the period, the overflow level at the Brisbane Metropolis Gauge would not have surpassed the Average flood level, or if 623, 000 millilitres was discharged outside of the period 13: 00 Mon 10th to 21: 00 Thursday 13th rather than during the period, right now there would not had been a avalanche at the Brisbane City Evaluate. O’Brien, 2011: 9) APPENDIX 7 AND 8 DAILY RAINFALL GRAPH AND GRAPH 7. 0 REFEERNCE LIST Apelt, Scar 2011, Joint Flood Taskforce Report March 2011, seen 19 Apr 2012, <, http://www. floodcommission. qld. gov. au/__data/assets/file/0017/6443/BCC_Attachment_13_-_Joint_Flood_Taskforce_Report_March_2011. pdf>, Himsley, May possibly 2011, Dams and Avalanche Mitigation, looked at 19 04 2012, <, http://www. actuaries. asn. au/library/events/Other/2011/Norm%20Himsley. pdf>, Honert, R & McAneney L 2011, ‘The 2011 Brisbane Floods: Triggers, Impacts and Implications’, Normal water Journal, Vol., Iss. some, pp 1149 ” 1173, viewed nineteen April 2012, <, http://www. mdpi. com/2073-4441/3/4/1149/>, Calligeros, M 2011, ‘Wivenhoe Dam discharge caused Brisbane flood: report, ‘ The Brisbane Moments, 11 Mar, viewed nineteen April 2012, <, http://www. brisbanetimes. com. au/environment/weather/wivenhoe-dam-release-caused-brisbane-flood-report-20110311-1bqk7. html>, Calligeros, Meters 2011, ‘Brisbane flood victims to confront the damage, ‘ The Brisbane Moments, 14 January, viewed 21 years old April 2012, <, http://www. risbanetimes. com. au/environment/weather/brisbane-flood-victims-to-confront-the-destruction-20110113-19q04. html>, Seqwater, 2011, The January 2011 Avalanche Event, seen 19 The spring 2012, <, http://www. seqwater. com. au/public/sites/default/files/userfiles/Factsheet-January_2011_FloodEvent. pdf>, Bureau of Meteorology, Feb 2011, Brisbane City in January 2011: A significant rain celebration and extreme flooding, looked at 21 Apr 2012, <, http://www. bom. gov. au/climate/current/month/qld/archive/201101. brisbane. shtml>
O’Brien, Marly 2011, Brisbane Flooding January 2011 A great Avoidable Disaster, viewed nineteen April 2012, <, http://resources. news. com. au/files/2011/03/22/1226025/997481-aus-news-file-obrien-report-replace. pdf>, Bureau of Meteorology, January 2011, Monthly Weather Review Queensland January 2011, looked at 21 Apr 2012, <, http://www. excelente. gov. au/climate/mwr/qld/mwr-qld-201101. pdf>, PM HOURS With Tag Colvin, DASAR, 8 Feb 2011, ABC Australia, Brisbane. (Also a radio transmit of it in <, http://www. abc. net. au/pm/content/2011/s3133417. htm>, )
